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Intelligence - xspying', in the popular imagination - operates
behind an aura of great power and influence. This is particularly
so in authoritarian societies, where intelligence gathering is
aimed at discovering, monitoring, and acting against opponents
of the regime: adjectives such as *hated' and xfeared' cling
almost automatically to intelligence agencies in this context.
This was true of South Africa in the apartheid years - and
beyond. At least from the time former prime minister John Vorster
appointed his lifelong associate Hendrik van den Bergh to head
the appropriately named Bureau of State Security (BOSS) , the
state's intelligence agencies were assumed to wield immense
power. The impression was strengthened by allegations that
intelligence services not only gathered information, but also
acted in ways which flouted even the government's laws. It was
they, it was assumed, who did in secret what their political
masters could not order in public. For example, in the 1980s it
was the chief of military intelligence, Joffel van der
Westhuizen, who ordered the * removal from society' of activist
Matthew Goniwe.
This perception did not die after 1990 - if anything, it was
reinforced. Military intelligence operatives and political police
were alleged to be destabilising the transition, an impression
partly confirmed by a 1994 Goldstone Commission report
implicating police intelligence officers in post-1990 violence1.
But the importance of intelligence seemed also to be confirmed
by a very different, although egually crucial, role which one
government agency played in the transition: it was the National
Intelligence Agency who served an important part in making the
first contacts with the ANC on behalf of the South African
Government. Meetings between NIS and the ANC began the process
which led to Kempton Park; if this leavened the belief that
intelligence agencies were simply instruments of repression, it
strengthened the belief that they were uniquely powerful.
This in itself may explain why negotiators considered the
intelligence issue important enough to warrant its own subcouncil
of the Transitional Executive Council, and its own set of
negotiations. In theory, these brought together those, as one
participant suggested, "at the forefront of the war" on both
sides and should have been central to a workable settlement. The
reality was different - but the role of the intelligence
community in the transition, the intelligence negotiations
themselves and the new structures they created, raise issues of
some importance for the transition and beyond.
Analysing the negotiations, their participants and the outcome
is no easy matter. Historically, public knowledge of the
activities of this countries intelligence agencies has never been
extensive. Although the rise of the Directorate of Military
Intelligence received much academic and media attention in the
mid-1980s2, in depth examination of the intelligence agencies
has lain largely beyond the public domain3. And for good reason,
it has been an offence to mention the names of employees of the
NIS besides that of its director-general4. Gaining access to the
inner workings of the agencies or persuading their employees to
talk is a difficult and time-consuming process.
However, this is probably a better time than most to write about
intelligence, since the transition has loosened some tongues3.
There is also a worldwide trend among intelligence agencies
towards slightly greater openness; here, too, this has prompted
a greater willingness in South Africa to answer enquiries6. But
nevertheless the culture of secrecy remains strong, and a shadowy
world in which disinformation remains a stock in trade is one in
which no information can be taken at face value. All this ensures
that this account covers only some aspects of the changing role
of South Africa's intelligence community7.
BREAKING THE MOULD
Changing the player to suite the game
One of the most central players in the negotiations was the state
intelligence agency, NIS - both in terms of planning aspects of
the initial stages of the negotiations on the government side and
carrying some of these discussions through. The de Klerk
presidency and the negotiations in particular changed NIS from
a relatively junior member of the state intelligence community
to its dominant agency: a new R140-million building was started
for its future occupation and it was reputed to employ between
2500 and 3000 people8.
NIS was the successor to Van den Bergh's BOSS. But its change of
name also signalled a change of role: during the 1980s it was
said to have been restricted to gathering strategic intelligence
needed for political decision making. It also had less influence
than military or police intelligence, since it lacked the
capacity to act on its information and was regarded to be more
of a "think tank"9. The Directorate of Military Intelligence in
particular had gained influence during the PW Botha era. It did
not restrict itself to briefing generals on military issues -
like NIS it submitted political intelligence estimates to the
government; it, not NIS, was deeply involved in countering
township rebellion in the mid-1980s. In some respects this was
fortunate for the NIS since it suffered little, unlike military
and police intelligence, from poor publicity after the ANC was
unbanned10. Although a co-ordinating committee consisting of
DMI, NIS and SAP representatives was established to ensure their
operations did not overlap, competition was inevitable and fierce
- "Angola [provided] a meeting place for two agencies on a
collision course", notes one analyst11.
And while NIS chaired the committee, the increased role which the
military played in government plans - in Angola, elsewhere on the
sub-continent and at home - ensured that DMI became the more
influential agency. This occurred even though many in the SADF,
outside of DMI, were said to be uncomfortable with its growing
role, particularly when some its activities which had nothing to
do with information-gathering - such as training Inkatha impis,
and covert operations aimed at the ANC - were revealed112
These developments seemed to reinforce a developing rivalry
between the three state intelligence agencies which was to play
an important role when negotiations on intelligence began13.
This did not mean that the NIS ceased to play a role: some
sources warn against exaggerating the ascendancy of DMI over NIS
in the PW Botha era. They point out that Botha acted as political
head of NIS during his whole term of office, and appointed Niel
Barnard as director-general. They claim NIS played a key role in
co-ordinating the intelligence community in this period14, and
initiated the shift away from the xtotal onslaught' thinking
which was dominant within DMI. This suggested, as did other
evidence, that Botha's security strategy did not rely solely on
DMI's war against the ANC and its allies. It was under Botha that
the first tentative steps towards a compromise with the ANC were
taken, and NIS was their instrument.
But DMI's strategy remained dominant until the possible contours
of a deal became clearer - as they did under FW de Klerk, who,
after he became NP leader, began to displace the influence of
military and police intelligence. They had largely derived their
influence from their operational roles: as troops withdrew from
the townships, diplomacy supplanted destabilisation in the sub-
continent and the ANC and PAC were unbanned, both their role and
influence declined. DMI again restricted itself to military
issues15, while the SAP intelligence function (the old Security
Branch) was restructured and renamed in 199116, and its
political role purportedly ended, although it is likely that it
continued to monitor the activities of the government's former
foes into 1992. Later evidence of destabilising activity within
both arms was the result of declining and splintering power, not
continued influence; there is little evidence that their actions
were approved - even less that they were ordered - by the
political authority, and some key personnel were dismissed when
the actions were revealed17.
It was easy to see NIS's waxing star purely as a result of a
change in government leader: it was moved to the office of the
president within the first week of De Klerk's tenure13 and
analysts claim that he gradually undermined the power of DMI
during his first years in office19. It was not new for a head of
government to give primacy to a particular intelligence agency:
Vorster relied on the SAP Security Branch; Botha enhanced DMI's
role. De Klerk, whose power base stemmed from civilian
politicians, may have preferred to use a civilian agency.
But, the use of NIS to make the first contact with the ANC
occurred before DMI influence began to wane - and before De Klerk
became president. There is some evidence that NIS were
influential in initiating the first meeting with the ANC
overseas, getting approval from Botha before his resignation but
(due to some administrative bungling) not informing De Klerk
fully of the proposed meeting20. And, NIS had also been party to
the internal talks with Mandela while Botha had still been
president21. Negotiation was not, for obvious reasons, a job for
DMI: it strongly opposed any contact with "the enemy" , and
fought a meeting "tooth and nail". This confirmed that it was
changing politics as much as changing presidents which paved the
way for the resurgence of NIS. If DMI was seen as a vehicle for
internal security during the emergency, NIS was the instrument
of negotiations - by both Botha and De Klerk.
Enemies together
Why send an intelligence agency to make the first contact22 -
particularly since NIS was sensitive to the charge that it was
making first contact with an enemy it had advised others to
avoid? NIS seems to have been fairly important in persuading the
government that a settlement was the only workable route. It had
done some internal work analysing how negotiations could be
conducted from a position of strength. But, there is some doubt
that NIS (although those close to it may claim otherwise23) had
planned or predicted the final outcome of negotiations as being
a transition to majority rule: evidence suggests that at least
part of the initial strategy was to split the internal and
external arms of the ANC. Notwithstanding this, NIS was the arm
of government which had thought through the need for, and
implications of, negotiations (whatever their final outcome) most
thoroughly. It was also the one best versed in secrecy - a
distinct advantage given Botha's paranoia that his early
initiatives would be discovered undermining his image as a strong
leader34. NIS was thus a natural candidate for carrying out the
first set of direct contact between the government and the ANC.
NIS operatives, and the ANC figures they met, stress that they
neither initiated nor controlled these early negotiations - they
were acting on instructions. But their orders (on both sides)
were to control the process - to keep it secret, and to limit the
agenda. After De Klerk became president, NIS argue that the
initiative needed to be centred in his office, and that contact
had to be controlled to ensure that the ANC did not deal with
more than one player, allowing it to play one off against the
other. But, both sides overestimated their ability to monopolise
a process which would have to include other parties. It was not
envisaged, a key ANC player Mo Shaik noted, that the process
would develop a dynamic of its own. But these initial contacts
were crucial both to the negotiations and to the future of
intelligence.
The first meeting between NIS representatives and the ANC took
place on 12 September 198 9 in strict secrecy in Lucerne in
Switzerland, without the knowledge of the %host' government25.
The NIS team was led by then deputy director-general Mike Louw,
the ANC delegation by Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki.
Discussion ranged around issues relating to the release of
Mandela, the unbanning of political organisations and, NIS's own
particular bugbear, the relationship between the ANC and the
South African Communist Party. No agreements were reached: both
sides say that the meeting aimed only at initiating first
contact, to assess each others' positions, and perhaps to prepare
the ground for the political principles to meet. Both parties
undertook to report back on the meeting.
The date of the meeting is significant: De Klerk was only acting
president at the time - he had been elected NP leader on 2
February but had only officially become president eight days
after the September meeting. And since it must have taken some
months to arrange the meeting preparations must have begun even
before he took over the NP - after all PW Botha had met Nelson
Mandela26. This seems to confirm that the change in government
strategy was more important than the change of leader. The
difference though lay in De Klerk's ability to carry the issue
through.
The first meeting led to others, and as the process developed the
number of participants expanded to form a body called the
"steering committee". On the government side, most were
intelligence people: Barnard, Louw and Marius Spaarwater (then
NIS chief of operations). The ANC delegation also included
intelligence figures Jacob Zuma and Joe Nhlanhla. But the
presence of Thabo Mbeki and Aziz Pahad on the ANC side and Fanie
van der Merwe of the Department of Constitutional Development on
the other confirmed that the subject matter was political
compromise, not intelligence work. Initially, the process
reguired gathering information about the other side
intelligence work. But both sides knew it would eventually move
into the political arena, and representatives of that world were
included as the contact developed.
Once the 1990 Groote Schuur Minute was concluded, the
intelligence men, according to most sources, withdrew to the
periphery of the process; the politicians and Constitutional
Development took over. But the "steering committee" continued to
play an important role when the process was in crisis. "There was
an unstated rule", an ANC intelligence official notes, "that the
[intelligence] agencies would step in when the process came
unstuck." The reason, he argues, was that they could find gaps
through which the process could continue to proceed. Sources on
the government side confirmed that the "old team" did come
forward whenever the process was endangered; they were able to
"play a constructive role because of the trust and good relations
developed from the very first meeting onwards". This role was
particularly important until the end of Codesa. After this, other
channels existed to resolve crises.
On military matters, among other areas, intelligence officials
played a fairly crucial role. At meetings which paved the way for
military negotiations, intelligence officials from both sides
were present27. Constitutional Development also had close ties
with the intelligence establishment - Barnard was later to become
its director-general - while ANC intelligence personnel were
influential in formulating policy, particularly as it affected
security issues.
Intelligence in a changing world
While the early stages of South Africa's negotiated settlement
got underway wider developments in the world were to have
important consequences for the post-apartheid intelligence
community. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European satellites effectively ended the Cold War and reshaped
the world order. On one hand, in NIS's assessments about the
process of change in South Africa the ending of the Cold War was
a crucial event - communism lost its power to directly threaten
any changes initiated in South Africa. More specifically for the
intelligence community, the changes precipitated a debate amongst
their colleagues the world over as to the future of the
intelligence functions of the state.
During the Cold War intelligence priorities between the super
powers were well defined: they concentrated on each other or in
theatres of the world where one was seen to have expansionist
plans over the other. Now, as the US Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has argued the jungle has changed - "it
is no longer the domain of dragons, but is now full of snakes".
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and a seeming increase in
the number of smaller (less controllable) conflicts or threats
a debate seeking to explore the new role - if any - that
intelligence agencies should have in the new world order began
to gain momentum28.
The debate has led to some reversal, and indeed collapse, of
roles: realist and liberal proponents of international relations
have to some extent adopted converging viewpoints29. Proponents
of the realist model argued, before 1990, that state policy
rested on the ability to be able to defend the national interest
against other states, who likewise are engaged in the pursuit of
national interest in a competitive environment. The intelligence
arms of the state were seen as a central component of the
preservation of the national interest by providing warning of
hostile threats and an ability to respond.
Liberal protagonists on the other hand asserted the importance
of norms and values, ideas of right or wrong, in the conducting
of affairs between states. While most liberals conceded that
intelligence was a necessary evil it was generally agreed that
the activities of the intelligence agencies should be made more
responsive to democratic values and more accountable to the
legislature and in certain cases to the judiciary.
A new school of thought which begun gaining prominence as the
balance of power in the new world altered - and which probably
links more closely to the liberal than the realist model - argued
that security should be given a much broader focus: in short,
"security is not only about power but involves a variety of other
factors including the interests of individuals"30. The broader
approach to security emphasised the importance of economic and
environmental issues and argued for a broader criteria by which
to judge whether people (rather than nations) are more secure:
this involves the normative dimension of conflict resolution,
conflict reduction and a concentration on issues which promote
the joint security of nation states.
The effect of adopting a broader definition of security is to
widen the intelligence brief - intelligence for good rather than
bad in the liberal perspective. Environmental protection, food
security, peacekeeping operations, disease control and disaster
relief could become possible intelligence priorities. A
concentration on these factors by governments and co-operation
between states, the new proponents of security argued, would
result in greater total security for all peoples. Realist
conceptions of the security of national states also expanded to
include organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and economic
competition as being dangers to the state.
The result is a new agreement on what intelligence can be used
for: an expanding field of priorities to take account of new
threats in a hostile world environment31. There have been,
however, notable dissenters on both sides: some realists argue
that the expansion of intelligence activities into areas of xnew
security' is inappropriate and that the role of intelligence
should be limited to finding out about and countering direct
threats to the national state; some liberals too argue that the
end of the Cold War implies that no intelligence function is
needed at all and that this activity can be carried out in
different ways by different government agencies. The counter to
both sets of detractors has been similar: precisely because the
world is changing so rapidly, and so too threats emanating from
the system, that a capacity to collect, evaluate and provide
assessments of dangers and opportunities is needed.
The expansion of the intelligence mandate into these areas is not
uncontroversial. Primarily, it is not clear whether intelligence
agencies are best suited to dealing with some of the broader
issues like environmental protection - these could be handled
quite competently by other government departments without any
secrecy. As it is, most of the equipment of current intelligence
services is geared to monitoring hostile, among others,
intelligence services, prevention of economic espionage,
potential situations of war or instability and organised crime
which are likely to remain a feature (if not an expanding one)
of the current environment.
The wider debate around security in the new world order was to
have interesting ramifications at home. With the decline of the
Cold War and the end of apartheid it seemed reasonable to assume
that the usefulness of a South African intelligence function
would, over time, decline. Instead, with a changing world order
the South African intelligence community, on both sides, began
a search to define a new role for itself. International debates
in and around other agencies was to have a profound influence on
the thinking of South African policy makers as they begun the
delicate process of integrating and restructuring the South
African intelligence community.
COMING IN FROM THE COLD: NEGOTIATING INTELLIGENCE
Having acted as midwife to political negotiation, NIS now turned
its attention, within the context of the wider debate on the
future of intelligence, to negotiating the future of its own
function with the ANC's intelligence arm.
ANC intelligence was the responsibility of a National
Intelligence Department, or NAT, headed since 1987 by Nhlanhla.
This was divided into security, counter-intelligence and
intelligence divisions; Zuma headed intelligence. It also had
a Military Intelligence department, headed by Keith Mokoape, who
had succeeded Ronnie Kasrils in 1987. Little is known about how
these departments operated, but it does appear that their
functions overlapped considerably: despite this, there is no
evidence of the rivalry noted in the government departments -
whether this means that there was none or that the secret was
better guarded is unclear. In principle, Mi's job was to obtain
intelligence needed for operations, and that of NAT to gather
strategic information and to secure the ANC against infiltration
by government agents32. ANC intelligence sources insist that
their operation was reasonably effective - they claim, for
example, to have recruited informants within the government's
military and civil service33. Once the ANC was unbanned and had
re-entered the country, it established a Department of
Intelligence and Security, headed by Joe Nhlanhla.
Both NIS and ANC intelligence officials had met before the
intricate talks around the future of South African intelligence.
Both had played a key role in nursing negotiations through the
early, difficult phase and this made it seem natural that they
should bargain the future of intelligence.
This history may explain why, in contrast to the police and
military, NIS did not resist the creation of a new intelligence
agency. This was agreed guickly, although integration was to
begin only after the election: neither side wanted to weaken
itself before an election by sacrificing its intelligence arm.
But the NIS's role in the transition may not have been the only
reason. While there is growing recognition of the role
intelligence agencies play in influencing policy34, unlike
militaries and police forces they have no power beyond that
bestowed on them by governments. Men in uniform who are ignored
by politicians might stage coups; intelligence operatives can do
little more than establish private consultancies. National
intelligence was used to changing when politics changed; it had
done so under the NP. To argue that it should remain unchanged
in an entirely new order would have been implausible.
Nevertheless, quick agreement on the need for a new agency was
only the first step. As later events would show, actually
creating the agency was much more difficult. Meanwhile, what it
should do and how it should do it remained to be negotiated.
Agreeing on principle
Like the military negotiations, discussions around intelligence
began with the government agency, NIS, briefing the ANC on how
it functioned and the principles to which it subscribed. The
briefing took place on 12 and 13 March 1993 at a NIS-owned venue
in the Transvaal. There was little discussion on a future
intelligence structure, and no agreement. Participants suggest
that the aim was simply to acquaint the parties with the current
state's intelligence operation.
What does seem to have emerged was agreement that a set of
principles for intelligence should be investigated. At three
meetings on 9,14-15 and 30 July, an appointed working group set
out to define these. Later, the TEC subcouncil on intelligence
was to be mandated to devise principles - but they were already
agreed by the time the mandate was issued. This initiative came
largely from the ANC, which had adopted its own principles at its
1992 policy conference, based on a discussion document written
by Mo Shaik, an ANC intelligence specialist.
These stated that an intelligence agency should guard the "ideals
of democracy, non-racialism, non-sexism, national unity, and
reconciliation in a non-discriminatory way". It must be
politically nonpartisan and reflect the country's racial and
gender balance: affirmative action was needed to achieve this.
They also argued strongly for parliamentary oversight:
"Intelligence activities shall be regulated by relevant
legislation, the bill of rights, the constitution and an
appropriate code of conduct"; intelligence institutions should
be "accountable to parliament and subject to parliamentary
oversight". And they clearly envisaged more open and accessible
agencies: the public "shall have the right to information
gathered by any intelligence agency with the limits of
classification consistent with an open and democratic South
Africa"35.
The ANC principles proposed a dramatic change to the ethos of
intelligence work. The were a reaction to past misconduct, and
thinking elsewhere in the world. In theory, greater openness
might offer ANC intelligence an advantage over its NIS
counterparts since it was likely to enjoy greater public sympathy
in a post-apartheid order. But it might also advantage NIS
operatives by enabling them to stress their role in
democratisation and their usefulness to the new order. The ANC's
preference for openness was not necessarily a bargaining
strategy: it may simply have reflected the reality that the
victims of past secrecy were mainly within its constituency. And
not all in the ANC opposed secrecy: Shaik, who argued strongly
for greater openness, apparently had to do so in the face of
opposition from within the ANC.
These principles largely shaped those which emerged from the
negotiations. The first principle agreed was that a single
agency be established. Tied to this was an agreement, never
officially stated, that it would have a new name: ^National
Intelligence Agency' appeared to be favoured early on, although
South African Secret Service' was also mooted in the press in
mid-1994. It was unclear at the time that agreement in
intelligence circles about the need to establish two agencies -
hence, the two different names - was beginning to harden. The
final structure would also include the intelligence capabilities
of the TBVC territories. Although these were believed to be
limited36, Transkei, Venda and, indirectly, Bophuhatswana later
participated in the Joint Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee
(JCIC), and Transkei sat in the TEC subcouncil on intelligence
(where its seat was a result of negotiation dynamics, not a
perception that it was a more important intelligence player).
Ciskei was not included in these arrangements, because it had no
civilian intelligence capability, although military ruler Oupa
Gqozo appeared to have employed ^private consultants' to do the
job. The PAC was to join the process at a later date.
Besides showing that both sides were committed to a new order,
this rapid consensus also showed a common interest in curbing
DMI's autonomy: both sides hoped that the creation of civilian
structures would reduce competition between the current agencies,
and more clearly define their roles37. But they were to find
that creating an integrated community entailed more than agreeing
on principle.
The agreed principles also recognised the need for parliamentary
control of the new agency, and other measures to ensure
accountability. It was suggested, for example, that its
headquarters no longer be secret, and that it recruit more
actively at all universities. But it was agreed that openness
would have to be balanced against the need for secrecy if the
agency was to be effective.
If these principles did not necessarily favour one of the
parties, two others clearly did - at least in the short term,
they could advantage NIS staffers. It was agreed that the
"constant flow of intelligence should not be disrupted". Current
structures would continue to function until they evolved into
something new. This, a person close to the old order has
suggested, reflected agreement on the need for a "balance between
continuity and change". Similarly, the principle of "effective
management" was agreed. That would imply, insiders suggest, that
particularly those at senior levels should be competent to
perform their task. The aim was presumably to limit political
appointments, and to ensure that affirmative action programmes
did not disrupt the new agency. It was also agreed that all
members of existing agencies would be eligible to join the new
one if they were suitably qualified. NIS, like the military and
police, relied on its claim to greater technical competence to
limit the effects of a change in government.
As happened in negotiations on the police and military, those on
intelligence guaranteed a role in the new order for those who had
maintained the old. That this was agreed with such ease -
indeed, that it was negotiated at all - seemed odd. But the
future of NIS's position (or at least it's staff) seemed
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reinforced by some international evidence showing not only that
intelligence agencies which serve authoritarian governments
survive change - the East German government retained Nazi
operatives. But, where authoritarian regimes were replaced by
democracies (as in Eastern Europe), the old agencies, while often
being dismantled, simply had their staff transferred to new
structures38.
In addition, NIS had some formidable bargaining chips. The fact
that a compromise between the old and new order was being
negotiated may have been primary - NIS's political principals
would retain a share in power and this might have ensured that
it would do so too. NIS's key role in initiating a settlement
also presumably lessened resistance to it. And it commanded
assets which ANC intelligence might not want to lose: arguably
greater technological capacity and professional training;
potential to gather intelligence on the white right wing, which
seemed likely to pose the greatest threat to the new order; and -
information on ANC politicians and operatives. After the
election, intelligence operatives claimed to possess information
on ANC figures who had worked for government intelligence,
information they would be more likely to reveal if they were no
longer employed. ANC sources also suggest that the
organisation's capacity to confront the NIS in negotiations was
constrained: ANC intelligence structures were characterised by
a degree of disorganisation and a limited strategic and
analytical capacity, as a result of its return from exile and
limited resources. What weight these factors carried is unclear:
what is clear is that the parties agreed that the new
intelligence agency would not be entirely new. It would, rather,
be a marriage between government and ANC intelligence.
Jack of all trades ...
The principles also defined what the new agency would do. They
seemed aimed at reducing its potential threat to democracy. The
effect was, arguably, to increase it. xNational security' -
consistent with developments in the international debate - was
defined extremely widely to include issues such as social and
economic welfare and the environment, an approach for which the
ANC had pressed. Shaik, at a conference on covert operations,
had declared: "The ANC strongly believes that national security
should be understood in comprehensive terms to include military,
political, economic, social, technological and environmental
dimensions." Intelligence should underpin "freedom, justice,
prosperity and development"39. Similarly, Laurie Nathan, who
advised ANC policy-makers argued that "security [should be]
conceived of as a holistic phenomenon which is not restricted to
military matters but broadened to incorporate political, social,
economic and environmental issues". Security was not only an
"absence of war", but was also related to the "pursuit of
democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and
a safe environment"40.
While this approach purported to ^ democratise' intelligence work,
its effect would be to expand its.activities and influence: the
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intelligence agency could be preparing assessments on anything
from population movement over borders to increased pollution.
This would presumably increase its connections to most government
departments, and centralise government strategy and analytical
work.
Its supporters said this would create an intelligence agency
which would be the "university of the state". It reminded
opponents of nothing so much as the joint security management
system of the Botha era: at the time, it was also assumed that
there was no issue which was not relevant to national security.
While supporters insist that an agency seeking to uphold a
democratic order would apply a wider brief differently, their
proposals did open the way for a larger, more intrusive agency:
there was no reason for NIS to oppose this - and much incentive
to greet it with enthusiasm. In a probable attempt to allay fears
of an overweening new agency, the principles stressed that
intelligence agencies were not policy-makers. But control over
information gives those who have it inevitable power over policy
choices - whatever commitments in principle they might make.
If this and other issues were agreed fairly amicably, one area
of dispute was a code of conduct for members of the new agency,
advocated by ANC negotiators. They wanted a code which would not
only bind operatives, but give them the right to disobey an order
which contravened it. NIS argued that a code, while a good idea
in principle, could not bind operatives but should serve merely
as ^guiding principles' or a ^statement of intent'. ANC sources
complained that the government "wanted a Ten ...Commandments
approach to intelligence" - a set of moral exhortations. The ANC
wanted detailed guidelines - in the form of a booklet, perhaps -
with real regulatory power. NIS replied that this would require
spelling out in detail the rights of operatives, or how to handle
sources. It would make intelligence work difficult, and could
endanger operations and agents. It wanted, says one source, a
xcryptic' code, which would bind agents as little as possible.
Negotiating positions on this issue were similar to those on
other security issues - the ANC wanted to restrict the
intelligence functions through greater civilian control; NIS
seemed to want to reduce political controls. The likelihood that
the civilian authority which would enforce the code would be
dominated by the ANC may have influenced thinking on both sides.
Similar issues lay behind negotiation on the TEC subcouncil on
intelligence. Eventually, though, negotiators agreed on a code
which sources describe as a "classic example of a good
compromise".
Behind closed doors:~ the intelligence subcouncil
Debate on an intelligence subcouncil raged both within and
between agencies- it was not simply a clash between competing
political interests. Broadly, however, NIS was initially against
a subcouncil, while pressure for it came from within the ANC.
Its supporters gave three reasons for a subcouncil. Firstly,
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since intelligence agencies had been at the forefront of the war,
at least at a strategic level, it would be a public sign of
reconciliation if they began to operate together; it might lay
the basis for further co-operation on difficult issues.
Secondly, if intelligence was excluded, the citizenry might fear
that one of the most controversial aspect of the old order was
out of reach of multiparty control: leaving it out would have
been "laughable". A subcouncil would also increase public
scrutiny of intelligence, and force its member to adjust to the
public domain - by, for example, developing the capacity to
handle public and media queries, and respond to publicity.
And thirdly, while this goes unmentioned by both parties, there
may have been a concern in the ANC that state intelligence
operations would need to be particularly accountable during a
transition they had been accused of ^destabilising'. A
subcouncil would allow them to be monitored. Certainly, despite
the ANC stress on * transparency', the subcouncil did not operate
openly. A press report written at the time gives an idea of its
ethos: the journalist concerned had asked a TEC representative
where the offices of the more secretive subcouncils were located
in the TEC building. The response was: "I am not liable to tell
you"41. But if the subcouncil did not usher in a new era of
openness, it did allow each party, in theory, to monitor the
other.
Arguments against a subcouncil were that it would expose delicate
negotiations before they were complete, and focus unnecessary
public attention on the activities of intelligence agencies.
NIS, ANC sources say, argued that the result sought by
establishing the subcouncil could be achieved by a "private
arrangement" between the parties. It argued that a subcouncil
would alarm sources or agents who relied on absolute secrecy.
The principle that a subcouncil should be established was
eventually agreed42. A new point of dispute then emerged: NIS
in particular did not want it to have any managerial control over
the day-to-day operations of the agencies. In response, the ANC
argued that it would oversee, not control, them. This was
recognised in the TEC Act in similar clause to that on the
military: "... the day to day management of every service remains
the responsibility of the relevant minister or head ... and all
services shall during this period of transition ... continue to
fulfil their duties to their respective principals". While the
Act•binds the parties to deal "with intelligence matters in a
manner conducive to the national interest and not sectional
interest", they would continue to do so as separate entities.
Once these points had been agreed, observers close to the process
suggest, it was fairly easy to draft the remainder of the
provisions establishing the subcouncil. They provided for a
joint co-ordinating intelligence committee (JCIC) comprising the
head or senior representative of each agency which would monitor
and liaise with the agencies and manage the subcouncil. It would
also initiate discussion on a new intelligence function.
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The subcouncil could also investigate, through the JCIC or
independently, the activities of any agency which acted against
its aims. It would enjoy the power to make what one participant
called "strong recommendations" to the agency concerned, which
could include the suspension of officers. It could also
recommend "steps to ensure that a service does not perform or
carry out any act or operation likely or intended to undermine
... the objects of the council".
One subcouncil function which touched a raw nerve on both sides
was the stipulation that it provide vevaluated information' to
the TEC and its subcouncils. This is information which has been
checked to ensure that it does not start rumours or spread alarm.
But this might imply that agencies could be asked about their
sources of information: both sides were sensitive to this, since
both presumably controlled sources within the opposition. In the
words of one party, "a blown agent can cause all sorts of
dynamics which would complicate the political process". Far from
becoming a source of dispute, this was an issue on which the two
sides clearly had a common interest - sources, it was agreed,
would remain sacrosanct.
The subcouncil, like that on defence, was also given the crucial
task of discussing the shape and function of the new agency. One
issue which it was meant to negotiate, the principles, had
already been agreed. But it was also to discuss the code of
conduct and to "facilitate the transition to a future
intelligence dispensation by commissioning research and
formulating proposals in this regard". It_ could also, make
"proposals regarding suitable legislation relating to the
practice of intelligence in a new political dispensation,
including suitable mechanisms of accountability and political
supervision". In effect, this meant turning the agreed
principles into legal terms of operation.
The potential importance of these discussions was increased by
the fact that the intelligence services, unlike the military and
police, were not regulated in the interim constitution. This,
one source close the ANC conceded, was simply because "the
agencies could not get their act together". In principle though,
this gave the subcouncil potentially greater scope than its
security counterparts.
Because it operated in secrecy - and because the principles on
which agencies would be integrated had been worked out before it
was established - it is not clear whether the subcouncil took
forward the task which began in March. But sources on both sides
suggest - with no great enthusiasm - that it became a rudimentary
intelligence oversight committee. Its members, they say ucame
to love its power . . . developing notions of their own
importance". This implied that any new oversight mechanism would
jealously guard its power to oversee intelligence. Whether this
would increase control over it, or simply broaden the small group
of insiders, seemed less than clear.
What is clear though is that neither the subcouncil nor the
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negotiations which preceded it agreed on the details of
establishing a single agency. While the subcouncil produced what
was referred to as a xfuture dispensations document', it was a
product of compromise'13 and regarded by sources close to the
process as a "weak piece of work", which never "properly defined
intelligence" nor properly delineated the functions of the
various future agencies of the intelligence community. In the
end, there appears to be agreement that the subcouncil produced
little of substance. Two months after the 1994 election, NIS
director Mike Louw, in his first public appearance before a
parliamentary committee, conceded that integration had not begun
and that no decision had been taken on how it was to proceed.
A cabinet committee was, he said, "considering the matter".
However, replying to further guestions, he said there were no
problems about what had to be done; the only issue was how it
should be done44.
THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION: INTKT.T.TGENCE AND THE FUTURE
At peace with ourselves
Throughout the apartheid era, intelligence was inevitably seen
as an instrument of minority rule. But, as the intelligence
negotiations showed, the end of apartheid did not necessarily
mean the end of national intelligence.
The most obvious reason is that even democracies retain
intelligence capacities to monitor external threats. Intelligence
practitioners noted that conflict in southern Africa could affect
this country, and would need to be monitored. The presence of
foreign intelligence agencies here created a need to monitor and
pre-empt their activities. More revealingly, throughout the
negotiations it was never argued that there was no further need
for a domestic intelligence role. One possible explanation was
that both sets of negotiators had a vested role in insisting that
a domestic threat remained, even if it did not. Intelligence
specialists on both sides remained influential in the policy
debate, and wielded power through control of information. And
many key politicians on both sides had some background in or
exposure to intelligence work. This may explain why there was no
thought of abandoning intelligence, or why it should remain
influential in future.
But the end of apartheid, intelligence insiders argued, would not
mean an end to real and perceived threats. Despite the
constitutional settlement, South Africa would remain a highly
volatile society: violence and instability had been so deeply
rooted that it would not disappear overnight. There were those
on the right and left who might try and destabilize the new
order, a point stressed inevitably by both sides. Shaik, who
argued consistently for more open intelligence work, cited this
in a plea for continued secret operations: "My personal view on
the issue of covert operations is that for a while, until... the
people of this country are safe...[it] may be a necessary evil
for a period..."45. -- -
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These threats provided intelligence with a rationale for
existence - and a potential too for influence. Their power
derives from a real or perceived ability to identify threats, and
this might give them the power to define "when we are safe".
Despite their all-knowing all-seeing aura, much of the data
collected by intelligence agencies is obtained from public
sources, such as newspapers and academic and specialist articles.
Strategic intelligence gathered covertly also requires analysis,
and operatives are not necessarily better at this than others.
But decision-makers do not always command the means to check the
intelligence they receive: therefore, while the intelligence
agency would not pose a threat to government , it would have an
important influence on policy, whatever the political history of
its operatives'16.
Since an intelligence function was bound to survive a settlement,
there was a strong argument for a civilian agency (or as it
turned out agencies). The military and police invariably
established their own intelligence capabilities. If there was no
civilian intelligence component, insiders suggested, they might
monopolise intelligence and be thrust again into a strategic
role, as opposed to the gathering of tactical intelligence. A
central agency could, in principle, ensure that intelligence was
the responsibility of those who could not act on the information.
This would limit its power, and reduce the prospect of
unauthorised or illegal action.
But if an intelligence arm was set to remain - and even grow in
the short term to accommodate all the services--- would its
operatives co-operate to support the new democracy? Could rival
agencies merge into what Louw called "an intelligence service at
peace with itself"47. The negotiations showed that the rival
agencies has some mutual interests. They showed too that there
were differences within as well as between the old adversaries.
But at least until the election, ANC and government intelligence
organisations remained rivals, and there was no guarantee that
they could merge easily. Shortly after the election, suggestions
that F W de Klerk might be given political responsibility for any
new agency prompted reports that "intelligence officials" were
advising the ANC against this, since it would ensure that the
agency remained partisan to the National Party*8. And the fact
that integration had not begun well after the election suggested
that bridging the divide between the rival agencies was more
difficult than the negotiators had assumed.
Building new structures
Negotiations before the establishment of and in the subcouncil
for Intelligence of the TEC constituted the first stages of the
establishment of a new South African intelligence capability.
Talks continued after the election as the opposing sides sought
compromise on the shape of the new community. The process
culminated in an announcement by Minister of Justice Dulla Omar
on Friday 21 October 199449 as to the nature and structure of
South Africa's new intelligence agencies. Three draft pieces of
legislation, an intelligence white paper and a document outlining
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the ^guiding principles' of the new South African intelligence
dispensation were released.
The draft legislation, which soon passed into law with little
debate50, envisaged two civilian intelligence structures: the
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for the collection of domestic
intelligence and the South African Secret Service (SASS) for the
collection of external intelligence. The army and police each
also retained an intelligence arm.
The National Strategic Intelligence Act allows for the defining
of the roles of the various agencies and the mechanism of co-
ordination between them. The role of military intelligence is
confined to the gathering of foreign military intelligence with
an emphasis on the southern African region - except in the case
of domestic deployment - but the military are explicitly
prohibited from gathering "intelligence of a non-military nature
in a covert manner". The South African Police Service are limited
to the gathering of crime intelligence. The NIA retains a
domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence function with SASS
holding the foreign intelligence brief.
Each of the four agencies is required to pass on national
strategic intelligence in their respective fields to an umbrella
structure, the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee
(NICOC) . NICOC consists of a co-ordinator as well as the heads
of each of the respective services. This committee has the
responsibility to serve as the co-ordinator and interpreter of
strategic intelligence in order to provide assessments to the
cabinet.
The reason why two civilian intelligence agencies resulted from
the process is unclear. The rationale could be linked to the
practical politics of compromise: the arrangement gave scope for
the inclusion of personnel from all the old agencies and allowed
a division of responsibility amongst the players. In the end, the
internal portfolio fell to an ANC appointee, Dr SW Sigxashe, and
the external one to Mike Louw51. What is more certain is that
the creation of two separate agencies will give the intelligence
community greater power than ever within the structures of the
state. And, at least in theory follow the models of Western
democracies whose own intelligence functions have both separate
internal and external arms.
While never publicly stated the reasons why the ANC should have
a firmer control on domestic intelligence is openly admitted in
intelligence circles: NIA is the bigger of the two services and
will have the greatest influence on policy at home having the
more important function of countering internal challenges to the
state. SASS, on the other hand, is the smallest of the two
services and while having a powerful influence on aspects of
government's external relations the agency will not have the
ability to interfere in politics at home. A more practical aspect
also suggests itself: SASS will be in a position to make use of
(and know where to find) old NIS assets in foreign countries
whereas ANC intelligence never had the resources or the need to
17
maintain as wide a network of external contacts.
The direct linkage with government, NICOC, which will act as a
channel and assessment centre for intelligence is in the hands
of Shaik, strengthening the linkage (at least at the highest
level) between ex-ANC intelligence operatives and government. Joe
Nhlanhla has also been appointed as a deputy minister charged
with the responsibility for intelligence. This is a more powerful
position than the portfolio suggests; Nhlanhla will sit in on all
cabinet meetings and be responsible for making sure the
politicians are briefed. The exclusive nature of the portfolio
(which in the past has usually been included in the Justice
portfolio) is, those close to the process argue, "very
significant" since it provides a direct channel between the
agencies and government.
Nhlanhla's appointment may also weaken Deputy-President de
Klerk's position in the intelligence loop - de Klerk chairs the
cabinet committee on intelligence and so oversees policy matters.
Nhlanhla, on the other hand, is more responsible for the day to
day operations of the agencies. How the distinction between this
function and the broader policy matters will be made is not yet
clear; what will occur, for instance, if Nhlanhla and de Klerk
disagree? The process so far has been non-conflictual: Nhlanhla
moved quickly to reassure de Klerk by emphasising that he will
report to cabinet through the cabinet committee.
Given the significance of these changes and the fact that the
intelligence agencies were in the forefront .of .the war to
maintain and dismantle apartheid, attempts at restructuring have
taken place against a backdrop of increased public and media
suspicion of intelligence abuses. The agencies have tried to
display a unified face to the public and have adopted a fairly
successful and low key- campaign to advertise their new presence
and structure. Each agency has a directorate of communication
responsible for ensuring a positive image for the agency and
countering media or public critiques. More broadly the
directorate has been tasked to link up with academic bodies and
think tanks to ensure a wider scope of information and analysis
is channelled through the agencies.
But, the South African intelligence agencies have not been
entirely alone in these efforts. Since 1980, intelligence
agencies in the United States and Britain have also come under
increasing scrutiny, and in some cases under the control of more
complex oversight mechanisms. Like elsewhere in the world, the
South African intelligence community has attempted to show a
friendlier face to the public: intelligence has been discussed
on television while prominent members of the intelligence
community have granted interviews to the media52.
The desire to show a friendlier public face is partially aimed
at removing excessive suspicion of the activities of the
intelligence community. It is also clear though that the degree
of openness will have its limits: while the director-generals may
appear in public of necessity other staffers and operational
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details will remain secret. It is unclear what debates the new
policy of openness have generated within the South African
intelligence community itself53: in Britain some insiders argued
that the changes to greater openness were merely the tip of the
iceberg which would eventually illuminate more than was necessary
for operational effectiveness3*.
But despite the positive media outlook bringing the agencies
together has not been unproblematic. Without fail senior
intelligence staffers have argued that the consolidation,
integration and affirmative action process was going better than
any other department. Yet, it is known that there have been
disagreements within the agencies about who should be placed in
which position and with what rank. And, since both sides kept
their intelligence functions intact until the last possible
moment in the transition the process of combination according to
an onlooker from another department (using the metaphor of
colonial change in African countries) is a "flag down, flag up
affair". NIA has virtually cleared of "NIS personnel from the
level of deputy-director general upwardsS5. This suggests that
if NIS's technical skills and expertise are to be retained they
should at least be closely controlled.
While some of these problems are common to other departments of
government, intelligence has been complicated by an additional
factor. A central point of tension has been the question of the
consolidation of sources. While this would strengthen a new
agency's capacity to gather information, the opposing agencies
agreed, as the first part of the paper showed, not to declare
their sources initially - perhaps with good reason, since doing
so might cause a grave political scandal. Each would also have
an incentive to implicate falsely key figures on the other side.
The new services then, in theory, might have begun with
operatives from different backgrounds telling each other what
they knew, but not how they came to know it.
Another concern of both intelligence agencies in the early stages
of the integration process stems from the fact that many of the
new generation of intelligence officers have been trained by
agencies overseas. This, it is feared, created greater
opportunity for recruitment by foreign powers, potentially
compromising the new intelligence function from the outset. All
new officers, it was agreed early on in the negotiations, would
undergo stringent security evaluations but this could, of course
hamper integration and later co-operation. Indications are though
that the parties generally started off by accepted the bona fides
of the other36.
An expanding mandate
The debate around the changing role of intelligence in the South
African context has been undertaken at the same time as more
specific debates around new structures for intelligence in the
country. It is important (and worth reemphasising) that the
creation of new democratic intelligence structures and the
combination of old intelligence functions from opposing sides has
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occurred simultaneously and cannot be abstracted from a broader
world wide debate as to the changing nature of the intelligence
function per se.
In line with their overseas counterparts, the changing world
order has, South African intelligence insiders argue,
considerably changed the nature of threats to national security.
Thus, the White Paper on intelligence suggests a more holistic
concept of security. Both the old agencies of the apartheid state
and the ANC Department of Security and Intelligence are said to
have embraced the new concept. This is clear from both the White
Paper and the document containing the xguiding principles' for
the new intelligence dispensation.
New thinking in the White Paper has four central elements closely
reflecting the earlier proposals of the ANC. First, security as
a holistic phenomenon incorporating political, social, economic
and environmental issues. Second, security aimed not only at
achieving the absence of war but encompassing the pursuit of
democracy, sustainable economic development and justice. Third,
a regional focus for security "seeking to advance the principles
of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement
of disputes". Finally, dealing effectively with a greater number
of issues, the document argues, "compels questions relating to
the vulnerability of society. National security objectives should
therefore encompass the basic principles and core values
associated with a better quality of life, freedom, social
justice, prosperity and developmentIIS7.
The White Paper argues that in "recent years there has been a
shift away from a narrow and almost exclusive military-strategic
approach to security1138. This broader concept of security draws
at least partly on the work of British academic Barry Buzan, who
recently argued for a broader understanding of the concept of
security39.
Bu2an's argument is complex, but basically he suggests that a
more integrative view of security is required on both a
horizontal and vertical level: "Some sense can be made of
individual national and international security, and of military,
political, societal, economic and environmental security as ideas
in their own right. But a full understanding of each can only be
gained if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security
as if it were confined to any single level or any single sector
invite serious distortions of understanding"60.
From the arguments spelt out in the white paper it appears that
ANC intelligence officers were influential in its construction.
This is not entirely the case. Insiders suggest that both-the ANC
and NIS intelligence advisors had studied Buzan's book and
similar texts and agreed on the new role for an intelligence
agency. The book appears as a reference in the document on
xguiding principles' along with other studies which propagate a
similar aim. The crux of Buzan's argument is that if national
security goals such as these are pursued: "...the logic is to
lead irresistibly in the direction of international and common
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security, so much so that the two cannot be separated in relation
to achievement of security as a policy objective"61.
The widening scope of the intelligence brief spelt out in the
White Paper and the xguiding principles' is controversial, and
two connected strands of opposition can be discerned.
The first points out that South African intelligence agencies
have always had a broad mandate: the 1971 Potgieter report on
state security spelt out, among other things, that economic,
social, educational and psychological aspects should all fall
into the scope of security given that threats to national
security could emanate from these areas62. The operation of the
Joint Management System during the 1980s was also an attempt to
provide a broader solution to the security problematic.
Thus, some opponents suggest, the new intelligence principles are
simply new wine in an old bottle. Connected to this is a fear
that the scope of intelligence activity could become too wide:
any issues perceived to be threatening to the state would be
allowed to fall into the ambit of intelligence activities.
The National Security Intelligence Act states that the functions
of the NIA will be to "identify any threat or potential threat
to the security of the Republic or its people". This is in line
with the broad concept of security. But, no attempt has been made
to delineate more tightly which areas should be of concern to
intelligence agencies.
In contrast Canada, in particular, has sought to provide a more
specific definition of what national security should mean to
intelligence agencies. The Canadian Security Intelligence Act
provides a statutory definition of what constitutes threats to
the national security of Canada. They include among other things,
"espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or detrimental to
the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in
support of such espionage or sabotage", and "activities within
or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat
or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property
for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada
or a foreign state". The Australian Secret Intelligence Act also
provides fairly specific definitions of what is considered
"subversive". An interesting inclusion in the Canadian Act is a
proviso that the focus of intelligence activity would not include
lawful advocacy, protest or dissent unless undertaken in
conjunction with espionage or sabotage activities63.
Of course, legalistic definitions like these retain the scope for
generous interpretation. What of those attempting to overthrow
the Canadian state? Surely no agency will wait for violent
objectives to be implemented but will investigate groups who
appear to be likely to follow such objectives.
These debates around a widening mandate for the South African
intelligence community have crystallised of late into some muted
opposition to the monitoring by the intelligence community of the
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Reconstruction and Development Programme64. The broadened scope
of the South African intelligence community's mandate has been
read by some as an attempt to "police" wider issues of economic
and social development as a monitoring agency for the RDP. While
sources close to the agencies argue that this is a
misinterpretation, the white paper contains explicit reference
to the RDP: "...the new approach to security holds that the
Reconstruction and Development Programme, as an organised and
collective effort of our society led by the Government of
National Unity, is integral to and forms the core of the
country's emerging security doctrine"65. In short, the argument
is that the RDP aims to develop South Africa's human resources,
build the economy, and contribute to a democratisation at all
levels of society. And, since these factors are essential for
peace and national security the role of the intelligence
community will be to secure this process through an integrated
understanding of the concept of security.
This approach may be problematic on three levels. The first is
the broad ranging definition that the RDP itself encompasses:
almost every aspect of society from resolving crime, increasing
imports and health policy are covered by the document. This, in
turn, implies that all these activities and any potential forces
who may disrupt them will be subject to the scrutiny of the
intelligence community. Thus, by arguing that the intelligence
community will focus on the RDP widens rather than narrows the
mandate of their operations.
Second, no clear distinction appears to have been made between
government policy and the security of the state. In theory, in
a democratic society the intelligence community should preserve
the security of the state and not the policy of any government.
Since the RDP is government policy should it not be outside the
concern of the intelligence agencies? Also, to argue for
oversight of the development process may be to misunderstand the
nature of development: by definition development usually occurs
by favouring one group over another simply because of the
scarcity of resources. This process is bound to give rise to
legitimate protest which rather than undermine the RDP serves to
warn political leaders about which areas or constituencies are
being neglected.
There are however three possible rebuttals which could be made
to such arguments. First, since the Government of National Unity
(GNU) is representative of all parties, it implies that the
linkage between government and state is closer than it would
usually be, thereby justifying a defence of policy. Second, since
the success of the GNU is essential to the future of South Africa
its policies should be secured. Third, the"role of intelligence
agencies would in any event be to act as a warning mechanism
which could preempt protest - and prevent disruption - by
forewarning government officials.
But these arguments though may be misconceived on a number of
levels. It is not at all clear that if the RDP fails that the
state will be threatened - such a conclusion relies on a
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subjective value judgement. As it is, given the complexities of
the political environment and their linkages to the policy
process, it is by no means evident what will be "good" for the
RDP and what will be "bad". Rather, the success of government
should be measured by its achievements and failures - this is by
nature a political process and not one which should involve
intelligence officers.
And surely, information relating to an assessment of the progress
of development initiatives could be collected and published quite
openly. If this is so, why should the process involve the
intelligence community? Couldn't every government department
assess the progress, challenges and dangers to its own RDP
programmes? This is not of course to argue that covert threats
to the RDP or to the state should not fall within the ambit of
the intelligence agencies. A reading of the white paper though
suggests that the intelligence community does not see itself as
being confined to this role66.
If anything the consolidating intelligence community appears to
be backing away from its commitment to the broad mandate: the
media spokesman has taken the blame upon himself for raising the
question of the RDP which resulted in some critical press
coverage. And, Joe Nhlanhla on his new appointment stressed that
the new intelligence agencies "would not spy on South
Africans"67. Some evidence remains though that the mandate will
not be contracted, rather its advertisement will be more
carefully handled. Shaik, in a presentation to a parliamentary
committee, also sought to limit the role by arguing that only
those who undermined the RDP or created conditions which made the
implementation of development difficult would be targeted. What
was not clear from the presentation was the distinction between
protest and activities that threatened to undermine the RDP. The
communication directorate of NIA has also stressed that the spy
masters do not want create a public debate about the role of the
agencies in the RDP or in wider issues since it could snowball.
While a conference was held earlier in the year with the RDP
office, neither department have seemed willing to go into any
detail as to its conclusions.
Oversight
Throughout the negotiations it seemed as if a more accountable
agency remained possible because this might be in the ANC's
interest. At least in the short to medium term, NIS had the
resources to maintain a grip on the running of the profession.
Goldstone Commission evidence that DMI officers had been engaged
in partisan activity during the transition was also said to have
reinforced the ANC's belief that better monitoring was needed.
Continued secrecy would also heighten fears among particularly
ANC politicians that intelligence officers might continue to
pursue their own agendas, even after the agencies merged. If the
ANC housed people who shared NIS's enthusiasm for secrecy it also
housed many whose experiences as activists had left them deeply
suspicious of secret intelligent work. Thus, when Louw appeared
before the parliamentary committee in June 1994, ANC MP Philip
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Dexter commented that "greater transparency" would mean that
"many of us wouldn't be so hostile to the idea of you getting any
money at all"68. This suggested that the intelligence community
might need greater openness to counter political resistance.
While the mandate for the operation of the South African
intelligence agencies remains fairly broad, the proposed
legislation and agreements provides for some form of oversight
and control. Primary among these is establishing a monitoring
mechanism for intelligence activities through the appointment by
the President of Inspector-Generals to each of the agencies.
Inspector Generals will have access to intelligence information
or premises under the control of the service to which they are
appointed. They will monitor and review the various services and
report to the relevant ministers.
And, the appointment of a parliamentary committee to oversee the
intelligence community also has important consequences.
Appointment to the committee will be restricted: its members are
to be picked by the President in proportion to party support, in
consultation with parties and with the concurrence of the
speaker. This is unlike other committees where parties choose
their delegates.
The functions of the committee, among others, will be to examine
the audit report regarding the accounts and financial statements
of the agencies, obtain a report from the Evaluation Committee
of the services considering any comments and recommendations
contained within, to review legislation relating to intelligence
and to order investigations as a result of public complaints.
As it stand now the functions it is not entirely clear how the
oversight mechanism will function in practice59. For instance,
its success may depend on whether it has a proactive or reactive
function. Whether, for example, the oversight structures should
hear general appeals against the intelligence structures or carry
out a broader process of review. Some evidence suggests that if
both functions are combined the oversight mechanism could become
bogged down in hearing complaints and not providing an overall
system of review. The South African case seems to have split the
two functions: public complaints are routed through the
parliamentary committee although investigations can be given to
the Inspector-General to carry out. The actual process of review
of the day to day operations of the Agency and Service appear to
lie with the Inspector-General while the broader process of
oversight and review of relevant legislation with the
parliamentary committee.
The broadness with which the oversight mechanism interprets its
mandate (as well as the resources it will have at its disposal)
will be crucial. If simply requesting information from the
intelligence community on specific items and then obtaining an
*official' response which is published through the oversight
mechanism the latter could simply become a conduit for
information that the intelligence community wants revealed. The
South African Acts make provision for both requests for
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information as well as an investigative capacity - in effect the
mandate of the oversight mechanism is open to fairly wide
interpretation.
Finally, another important and related question is where the
oversight mechanism starts and stops? This needs to be clearly
defined in the oversight mandate- Is a process of review of
continuing operations possible, or, only once operations have
been finished and vthe files closed'? In the latter case this
would make the oversight mechanism merely the "historians of the
intelligence community". And, since intelligence often functions
on the principle that knowledge held today may be useful
tomorrow, intelligence files may never be closed or will be
closed only on the discretion of the intelligence community
itself. Alternatively, a mandate can be spelt out which argues
that intervention is required when public concern arises - while
this is an advance it has the notable limitations of making the
oversight mechanism purely reactive to events that have already
occurred. It would appear from the South African legislation that
the process of oversight would be continuous. This applies more
to the office of the Inspector-General than it does to the
parliamentary committee. Although the committee does have full
access to the documents of the intelligence agencies and can
"deliberate upon, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and make
recommendations" the relationship with the agencies will in all
likelihood be more distant and less continuous than that of the
Inspector-General. The Inspector-General will need to act as a
crucial intermediary between the parliamentary committee and the
intelligence community flagging issues of concern. The integrity
and independence of the Inspector-General as well as her/his
relationship to both parliamentary committee and the intelligence
agencies will be crucial to the effective functioning of the
system.
CONCLUSION
The role of intelligence actors in the maintenance of apartheid
goes without question. Yet, less work has been done on the
changing role of South Africa's intelligence community since
1990. This is a crucial gap in the literature on the South
African transition. Even more so since many of the processes that
shaped the involvement of intelligence actors in the negotiations
have been central in determining the shape and function of the
post-apartheid South African intelligence community.
On the government side negotiations allowed the rise to
prominence of NIS - as both an arm of negotiations and the
strategiser behind it. This was the beginning of the process -
continued in post-settlement South Africa - where the demise of
military and police intelligence began. Both have been reconfined
(after a period in which their names have been blackened by their
activities in the dying days of white rule) to more specific
roles. The civilian intelligence components now form the central
players in the intelligence community.
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This is a result not only of their influential process in shaping
the negotiations but also in a widening brief. The latter is at
least in part a reflection of a broader debate about the future
of intelligence agencies in the new world order. While more
publicly attached to ANC analysts such an approach appeared to
find some agreement within the senior ranks of NIS. These debates
shaped much of the earlier process of negotiations around the
future of intelligence in South Africa concluding with agreement
around a set of principles for intelligence and a code of conduct
for its operatives.
More crucially the debate was to be reflected in the white paper
on intelligence which spelt out publicly for the first time the
new role that the spies envisaged for themselves. And
importantly, it is hoped to include the wider brief in the new
constitution. The result is both positive and disturbing.
Positive, in demonstrating intelligence agencies eager to show
that they are as much part of rebuilding the society as they were
in fighting over who should control it. Disturbing, in allowing
the growth of the intelligence mandate to cover a wider (and
potentially expanding) range of activities.
While the broad mandate is contained to some degree by processes
of oversight - more comprehensive than anything in South Africa's
history - it is too early to determine just how successful they
will be in fulfilling their brief. But the actions of
intelligence operatives are constrained to the degree that the
expanding mandate only applies to the civilian agencies who have
no power to act on intelligence received but simply pass it
through a co-ordinating network to the politicians. The police
and military intelligence functionaries have been confined to
more specific roles although they too, at least theoretically,
are not excluded from the broadened concept of security.
This contains some potential for overlap and competition between
the four agencies. The military, NIA and SASS in southern Africa,
police intelligence and the NIA at home. Given these possible
areas of competition the role played by NICOC in processing and
delivering strategic intelligence to the political players will
be crucial. How powerful this connection will be has yet to be
demonstrated. Current indications are, however, given a number
of recent appointments that the intelligence chiefs have the ear
of government and will be fairly influential. How this
relationship in particular develops should be a crucial aspect
of study for those examining new South African security
relationships.
But, the process of consolidation of the intelligence agencies
has been far more difficult than the agencies themselves admit.
This is in part a reflection of their late start due to the need
for each side to retain its intelligence arm until the end, and
more practical problems relating to sources and staffing. Despite
these factors it is significant that new agencies were formed
from the old: those who sought to maintain apartheid - with
notable changes in the leadership echelons - will continue their
defence of the new government.
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Ultimately, however, the role of the new intelligence agencies
would depend on the political order which is currently emerging.
Intelligence communities are far more creatures of political
circumstances than armies or police forces. If the parties to a
government of national unity find ways of co-operating, so too
will their intelligence operatives. If they do not, intelligence
may again become a weapon in the hands of competing parties. If
stability and democracy are consolidated, the agencies seem
likely to play a similar role to that of their counterparts in
established democracies. If democracy and stability remain some
way off, the agencies and the intelligence community more
generally could become the vehicle for covert operations against
new - or in some cases, the same - enemies.
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